The Impact of Governance Structure on Firm Performance: Evidence from Japanese Local Mixed Enterprises by Tomoyasu Tanaka & Takao Goto
1
The 51st Congress of the European Regional Science Association
The Impact of Governance Structure on Firm Performance: 
Evidence from Japanese Local Mixed Enterprises (LMEs)
Tomoyasu Tanaka
Kinki University, Faculty of Business Administration
3-4-1 Kowakae, Higashi-Osaka, 577-8502 JAPAN
(E-mail) tanakatomo@bus.kinda.ac.jp
Takao Goto
Kinki University, Faculty of Business Administration
3-4-1 Kowakae, Higashi-Osaka, 577-8502 JAPAN
(E-mail) t-goto@bus.kindai.ac.jp
[Abstract]: Using  the data from Japanese LMEs in the tourism industry, this paper aims to 
evaluate the impact of governance structure on their performance. Our main findings are as 
follows: the percentage of local government ownership has a negative impact on performance. A 
1% decrease in local government ownership results in currents profits improving 0.129% at the 
sample mean. As  for the board composition of LMEs, it is not clear if the degree of local 
government participation affects performance.
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1. Introduction
Fiscal reform of local government spending is an important policy in Japan. The slow Japanese 
economy has prevented a drastic increase of revenue taxation whereas fiscal expenditures on 
economic pump-priming measures, combined  with an aging  population and the diminishing 
number  of  children has  left  many  local  governments  confronting  a  serial  fiscal  crisis. 
Additionally, local mixed enterprises (LMEs), which are jointly owned by local governments 
and the private sector, also face financial difficulties, coming under pressure to improve their
performance. The expectation was that when LMEs were first established, the involvement of
the private sector would result in greater public  service efficiency. However, this has not been 
the  case  as  many  LMEs  have  been  in  deficit with some having  gone  bankrupt. The poor 
performance of LMEs resulted in local governments needing support further adding financial 
woes to the state. In response, in 2007, the national government enacted “the Local Public 
Finance Reconstruction Law,” aimed at leading  both local governments and LMEs towards 
achieving fiscal soundness.
  Some  previous  studies  argue  that the  governance  st ructure  of  a  firm,  which is publicly, 
privately, or  jointly owned,  is  an  important  factor  determining performance.  For  example, 
Boardman and Vining (1989) find that mixed enterprises and state owned enterprises perform 
substantially worse than private companies. Majumdar (1998) argues that enterprises owned by 
central government and the state are the least efficient in their operations than either mixed or 
private enterprises, while mixed enterprises are less efficient than private enterprises.   M ok and 
Chau  (2003) also find that mixed enterprises are significantly more unprofitable than fully 
privatized corporations. Therefore, it is clear from these studies that the degree of governance 
control affects performance, with greater state-owned control resulting in lower efficiencies than 
privately owned enterprises. 
  There  are  a  few  empirical  studies  conducted  of  Japanese  LMEs, which investigate the 
relationships between government structures and their performance. Akai (2006) shows that the 
percentage ownership of private sectors has a negative impact on the performance. On the other 
hand, Matsumoto and Goto (2010) find that a lower percentage of private sector involvement, 
and  a greater percentage of  board  members derived from the private sector,  results  in poorer 
performance. Therefore,  although they  examine the  impact  of  governance  st ructure  on the 
performance, the results are not necessarily consistent.
  Under  these  circumstances,  we  are  under  the  impression  that the  governance  structure 
determines LMEs performance, and this is examined  by the following  hypothesis.   The  first 
step is to verify whether or not local government’s percentage ownership has a negative impact 
on the performance of a firm, and if it does, to calculate the impact on the performance when the 3
percentage  ownership  changes  by  1  %. Additionally,  it  is  required  to  determine  how  the 
relationships between the compositions of the board (public or private sector derived) affect 
performance. For this study the data from Japanese LMEs in the tourism industry are examined, 
as  the  purpose  of  the  LMEs  is  far  clearer  for that  industry.  In  the  light  of  tough  market 
competition  in  the  tourism  industry,  both  private  companies  and  partially  owned  local 
government LMEs aim to operate profitably.
  This article is organized as follows: section 2 describes the overview of LMEs in Japan.   I n 
this section, we focus on the particulars of the establishment and financial conditions of LMEs.   
Se ction 3 explains the methodology and data.   W e explain the performance function for the 
analysis  and  then  define the  data  used  in  the  analysis.   F inally,  section  4  summarizes  the 
empirical results of this study.
2. The Local Mixed Enterprises in Japan: Overview
LMEs  in Japan were established  during the  late  1960s
1.    During  Japan’s  economic  boom 
period and to achieve rapid economic growth, the government had to solve regional imbalances.  
However, with the government already in debt and along with a shortage of public funds, the 
government initiated  plans to  introduce  private funds  for  regional  development projects  by 
involving local governments and private companies to establish LMEs.
  During  the  1980s,  attention  focussed  on  the  financial  woes  of  government  due  to  the 
inefficient use of public money. For example, if a local government planned to establish an 
enterprise to manage leisure facilities (e.g. amusement parks) as a means of revitalizing an area, 
the government lacked money, know-how and talented staff to efficiently manage the facility,
and it was  unlikely that the facility would perform well. It was therefore encouraged for local 
governments to establish LMEs, which responded by  setting up LMEs in several sectors: the 
management of leisure facilities, the development of housing estates and industrial complexes, 
the distribution of agricultural crops, the management of educational facilities, the operation of 
railways, and so on. Therefore the aim of the local government was to jointly establish an LME 
with the private sector, which had the skills and knowledge to manage these enterprises, leading 
to greater efficiencies and better use of public money. 
  In 1986, the national government enacted the “Private Participation Promotion Act,” an act 
providing monetary incentives for local governments to promote to set up LMEs. In order to 
establish LMEs, local governments were able to receive grants from the national government as 
well as take low interest loans from public financial institutions. Figure 1 shows the growth of 
                                                  
1 In this section, we explain the particulars of the establishment of LMEs by the reference to 
Idei (2002).4

















Figure 1 Numbers of newly established and abolished LMEs
Source: Reports on Local Mixed Enterprises and Local Public Corporations.
Note: The number of LMEs abolished prior to 2002 was not available.
  The 2000s saw the numbers of newly  established LMEs decrease rapidly from their peak, 
with more than one hundred LMEs being abolished in 2009.    Up until 2003, the numbers of 
newly established LMEs was greater than the numbers abolished. It wasn’t until 2004 that the 
numbers  of abolished LMEs superseded those that were newly established. The Ministry of 
Internal  Affairs  and  Communication (MIC, 2010)  cites the  main  factors  behind  abolishing 
LMEs were  due to poor performance and difficulties involved in improving performance
2. As 
for  the  LMEs’ business  conditions,  MIC  (2010)  shows  that  in  2009, the  percentage  of 
loss-making LMEs was 32.3% and the percentage of LMEs that received financial support from 
local governments was 46.6%.   R ecently large numbers of LMEs have suffered the economic 
downturn in business and have been closed.
  It is the author’s belief that the performances of LMEs are closely related to the governance 
structure, however, the relationship between the financial situation and the percentage of local 
government ownership needs to be addressed further.   
Table 1 details the numbers of loss-making LMEs in the tourism industry by the percentage of 
local government ownership. The percentage of loss-making LMEs in the tourism industry is 
37.5%, slightly higher than the total of LMEs (32.3%). Local governments with a stake less than 
                                                  
2 The other reason is that LMEs had already attainted their business purpose.5
20%, results in the greatest numbers of loss-making LMEs (62.5%). When the percentage of 
government ownership increases to over 80%, the findings show that this results in the second 
largest numbers of loss-making LMEs (45.4%). The least loss-making LMEs can be found when 
the  percentage  of  government  ownership  is  between  20-40%.  However,  by  ignoring  the 
category of less than 20% government ownership, it could  be  argued  that the percentage  of 
loss-making  LMEs  is  positively  correlated  to  the  percentage  of  local  government  funded 
equity
3.
Ta ble  1 Number  of  loss-making  LMEs  in the tourism  industry  by  the  percentage  of  local 
government ownership 
Total LMEs Loss-making LMEs
Percentage of 
loss-making LMEs
less than 20% 8 5 62.5
20 - 40% 78 22 28.2
40 - 60% 263 96 36.5
60 - 80% 149 51 34.2
more than 80% 163 74 45.4
Total 661 248 37.5
Source: Reports on Local Mixed Enterprises and Local Public Corporations.
Note: The figures in this table are calculated based on the data used in this study.
3. Methodology and Data
3.1 Methodology
Using  the data of Japanese LMEs in the tourism industry, the objective of this paper is to 
estimate the impact of governance structure on performance. When calculating performance the 
productivity or the measured efficiency is frequently used. This requires accurate data relating 
to inputs, outputs, input factor prices, costs, and so on.   H owever, as those data are not readily 
available,  it  makes  the  task  of  calculating the  productivity or  efficiency rather  difficult.   
Nevertheless,  as  the  data of  current  revenues  and  expenditures,  current  profits  are  readily 
available these provide the performance indicators required for this study.
  The performance is explained by several factors. The first factor is the ownership structure 
                                                  
3 As there are only eight LMEs with less than 20% government ownership, it is doubtful that 
the smaller the ownership percentage of local governments results in the greatest percentage of 
loss-making LMEs.6
(OW N).   A s  described earlier, local governments and the private sectors jointly own LMEs.   
If local governments have a larger stake in an LME, then they may attach weight to fulfilling a 
public need in lieu of profitability. On the contrary, if the private sector owns the majority stake 
in an LME, then its  aims will  be  profitability and  operational efficiency. Previous studies do 
show that the performance of enterprises with strong government involvement tends to be worse 
(Boardman and Vining, 1989; Majumdar, 1998; Mok and Chau, 2003). Therefore, we expect 
that  the  percentage  of  local  governments  ownership  impact  negatively on  enterprise
performance.
The second factor is the degree of local government participation in the board, (BOD). The 
board  consists of members who are from both local governments and the private sector. The 
greater  the  numbers  of  board  members  elected  from  local  governments  logically  implies 
stronger local government control of the enterprise. Therefore in such enterprises, the pursuit of 
profits will not be a priority, resulting in a negative relationship between the percentage of board 
members from local governments and performance.
The third factor determining the LME performance arethe prevailing market conditions (XM). 
A large concentration of similar enterprises results in greater competition, which in turn affects
performance. Therefore, the coefficient of the market condition has a negative sign. On the other 
hand,  a  large  concentration  of  similar  enterprises can  have  advantageous  agglomeration 
economies, resulting in a positive effect on the coefficient of market conditions. In this study, 
we use the tertiary industry ratio as a proxy variable to express the market conditions, as the 
percentage data for the tourism industry as a whole is not available.
  Finally, the characteristics for each LME factors are described. The first characteristic is the 
LME size (XS). A large size equates to greater profitability. Thus, the relationship between the 
performance and the size of the LME is positive. The second factor in this category is the debt 
factor (XD). An LME with a large debt would represent a poorly performing enterprise, for 
which  the  manager  would  be  held  responsible.  However,  this  may  in  turn  incentivise 
management to operate more profitably, and hence we  expect the impact of debt to have a 
positive performance. The performance function can therefore be specified as follows:
  PER = 0 + W OWN + BBOD + MXM + SXS + DXD + u,       (1)
where PER : firm performance,
     OWN : ownership structure,
     BOD : degree of local government participation in the board,
     XM : market condition,
     XS : firm size,7
     XD : debt ratio,
     u : error term.
  We  are especially interested in two coefficients W and B measuring the impact of the 
governance structure on the performance.
3.2 Data
Data  is  obtained  from  several  sources,  the  main  source  being “Reports on  Local  Mixed 
Enterprises and Local Public Corporations (Dai3  Sekuta nado  no  Jokyo ni Kansuru Chousa 
Kekka)” issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (MIC). This lists 662 
LMEs in the tourism industry. We used a cross-section of 661 LMEs as the data set, excluding 
one LME because its total revenues are  disproportionately larger than the others,  which  is 
therefore excluded, as we have a number of other factors that we need to take into account. 
  The definitions of the variables employed in this study now  follows. A statistical summary of 
variables used in this study is shown in Table 2. As for the performance measure (PER), we use 
current  profits obtained from  Reports on  Local  Mixed  Enterprises and  Local Public 
Corporations. As the total revenues include grants from local governments, we exclude grants 
from current profits.
  The explanatory variables are defined as follows. The ownership structure variable (OWN) is 
the percentage of local government funded equity in the overall equity. The board composition 
variable (BOD) is  defined  by  the percentage of full-time and part-time board members  who 
were transferred or retired from local governments in total board members. The data related to 
equity and board members is shown in Reports on Local Mixed Enterprises and Local Public 
Corporations. As  for the market conditions, we consider the tertiary industry ratio (XM). We 
define the percentage of employees in the tertiary industry. The numbers of employees in the 
tertiary industry and all industries are obtained from The Establishment and Enterprise Census
(Jigyousho Kigyo Toukei), issued by the MIC. There is tertiary industry ratio for 2008 as the 
census was carried out in 2006. Therefore, for this analysis we assume that the tertiary industry 
ratio in 2008 equals the 2006 value. As for a proxy variable to express the LME’s size, we use 
the number of employees (XS). The debt factor (XD) is defined by the debt-equity ratio. These 
measures  are  both  obtained  from  Reports on  Local  Mixed  Enterprises and  Local Public 
Corporations.8
Ta ble 2Statistical summary of used variables
Variables Unit Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
PER Million yen 1.381 49.951 -336.126 977.792
OW N % 61.567 20.679 2.632 99.888
BOD % 23.304 21.522 0.000 100.000
XM % 68.279 9.469 29.800 93.600
XS Person 20.380 20.136 1.000 232.000
XD - 3.695 39.295 0.000 998.190
3.3 Estimation Results
The regression analysis is applied for the performance function (1). The OLS method estimation 
and the regression results are summarizedin Table 3.
  For the first case, the results are estimated from the data of 661 LMEs. Although the values of 
adj-R
2 are  low ,  the  F statistics  values  are  statistically  significant  at  1%, an  acceptable 
specification. The coefficient of OWN shows a negative sign, which is statistically significant at 
the 10% level. Although the impact of the ownership structure on the performance is statistically 
weak, it does however confirm the main hypothesis of this study. Moreover, we find that a 1% 
decrease in local government ownership results in a 178 thousand yen increase in profitability. 
This  implies that decreasing  local  government  equity  stakes in  an  LME by  1%,  results  in 
0.129% increase in profitability at the sample mean. The board variable (BOD), which shows
the degree of local government participation in the board, is negative but is also not significant. 
As a result, the current findings show no links between local government involvement in the 
board and LME performance. As for the market conditions (XM), the coefficient is positive and 
is statistically significant. These results show  that by  having a large  concentration of similar 
enterprises contributes to the performance. The coefficient of the size variable (XS) shows the 
positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1 % level, signifying that a greater the number 
of employees leads to better performance. However, the debt-equity ratio (XD) has a negative 
impact on the performance, meaning that a large  debt  does  not incentivise management to 
perform well.
In order to confirm the robustness of the results, case 2 included 58 observations of LMEs
that are fully owned by local governments. The results obtained are compared with the results 
obtained in case 1. With the OWN coefficient being negative and statistically significant at the 
5% level, it is apparent to conclude that the percentage local government ownership of an LME 
has a negative impact on performance.
However,  it  could  be  argued  that  the  governance  structure  and  the performance are 9
determined  simultaneously  (Boardman  and  Vining,  1989;  Hamilton  and  Nickerson,  2003; 
Chong, et al., 2006; Ruester and Zschille, 2010).   That is, if an LME is performing poorly, a 
greater  degree  of  local  government ownership  wo uld prevent the  LME  from  going  out  of 
business, rather maintaining local employment than wanting to achieve operational efficiency. If 
the ownership structure is endogenous, econometric problems arise. We test whether or not the 
governance structure and the performance are determined simultaneously
4. From the results, we 
can conclude that OWN is not endogenous and supports the results in cases 1 and 2.
Table 3Estimation results



































Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
    Statistically significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).
4. Concluding Remarks
Both local governments and  LMEs in Japan face serious  fiscal difficulties and  the need for 
fiscal  reconstruction is an urgent task.  Policy makers are interested  in the factors affecting 
LME performance, in particular factors that improve performance. In this study, we argue that a
governance structure is  an important factor determining the performance of an LME. Using 
econometric techniques  we  evaluate the impact of the governance structure on performance.  
                                                  
4 The test procedure is explained in for example Wooldrige (2002).10
From our analysis we conclude:
 A  1%  decrease in local  government ownership results in currents profits improving 
0.129%  at  the  sample  mean.  Thus local  government  ownership  percentage  has  a 
negative impact on the performance.
 The composition of the board does not have an effect on the performance.   It is not 
clear as  to how the degree of local  government participation in the board degrades 
performance. 
 Other factors, such as, the tertiary industry ratio, which is a proxy variable to express 
the  market  conditions,  and  the  size  of  LMEs,  both have  a  positive  effect on the 
performance, whereas the debt-ratio factor is negatively correlated with performance.
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